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A PRODUCT OF CHILDHOOD: ACCOUNTING
FOR AGE IN THE MIRANDA ANALYSIS
Ariana Rodriguez*
One of the most polarizing areas of constitutional
criminal procedure is that relating to police interrogations
and confessions. While the Fifth Amendment guarantees a
number of protections from self-incrimination and the
inherently coercive nature of criminal investigation, these
Constitutional promises are more likely to go unfulfilled
when the accused is a child. This Article thoroughly
examines the current law’s use of the “totality of the
circumstances” test in deciding whether a valid Miranda
waiver occurred or whether a juvenile has been taken into
custody and, more importantly, explores why this current test
remains an inadequate solution for protecting children’s
Miranda rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“All right. So, you have the right to remain silent. You know what
that means?” Detective Hopewell asked.1 “Yes, it means that I have
the right to stay calm,” replied 10-year-old Joseph.2
The recent case In re Joseph H.3 has prompted much debate in the
legal community over the question of how child suspects should be
treated during a criminal investigation, particularly with regards to the
protection of a child’s Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation.
As the law stands today, the exchange above between young Joseph
and Detective Hopewell is sufficient to constitute a waiver of Joseph’s
Miranda rights—a decision carrying significant legal consequence. 4
Meanwhile, however, modern developmental and neurological studies
of juvenile development show, more clearly than ever, that juveniles
actually lack the experience, maturity, and judgment necessary to
make such legal decisions independently.5 The resulting outcome is
that the present law does not adequately protect children from having
their legal rights violated.
While significant juvenile criminal law reforms have begun to
take shape in California, the current solutions offered have yet to fully
ensure that children’s Miranda rights are protected. In response to
Joseph H., for example, the California legislature attempted to
implement Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”)—legislation that would have
required minors under 18 years of age to consult with legal counsel
prior to a custodial interrogation or Miranda waiver.6 While this
measure would have provided significant protection for all children,
the bill became caught in the political web.7 Instead, a new version of
the bill, Senate Bill 395 (“SB 395”), was passed and signed into law
on October 14, 2017.8 This 2.0 version protects only those children
aged 15 and under.9 Thus, despite a continuing need for improvement
1. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting).
2. Id.
3. 367 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015).
4. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 185 (Ct. App. 2015).
5. See infra pp. 125–127.
6. S.B. 1052, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
7. SB-1052 Custodial Interrogation: juveniles., CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (last visited Apr. 7, 2019),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052.
Governor Brown vetoed the first version of the bill, Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”), after citing
concerns that the bill could obstruct police investigations. Id.
8. S.B. 395, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
9. Id.

RODRIGUEZ_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE)

650

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/15/19 8:37 PM

[Vol. 51:647

in this area of California law, an all-encompassing solution has not yet
arrived.
Although those in search of a solution should continue fighting
for all children through the California legislature, they should also
consider doubling their efforts by urging the California courts to
revisit their application of the law on this issue. Current law requires
the courts to consider the “totality of the circumstances” in deciding
whether a valid Miranda waiver occurred or whether a juvenile has
been taken into custody.10 However, as this Article argues, the courts’
application of the totality of the circumstances test (“totality test”) is
incomplete at best (and plainly subjective at worst) because it does not
adequately ensure that the characteristics of childhood are accounted
for in analyzing whether a child’s Miranda rights have been violated.
In particular, this Article argues that the analysis is presently failing to
account for children as a unique and vulnerable class of citizen and
argues for modifying the test to ensure the appropriate weight is given
to a child-suspect’s age.
Part II of this Article details the current law regarding criminal
procedure and the Fifth Amendment, and provides a timeline of this
law’s evolution as it pertains to children. Part III provides a critique of
the Court’s current application of the totality test in cases involving
children’s Miranda rights. Part III then closes with an explanation for
why a child’s age should be given substantial weight under the totality
test by providing modern findings surrounding juvenile development.
Part IV explores the strengths and weaknesses of other potential
solutions in applying Miranda to children, and ultimately concludes
that, regardless of additional legislative protections, the totality test
should consider whether a waiver or confession was a “product of
childhood.” Part IV also argues that, by including a direct “product of
childhood” inquiry under the umbrella of the totality test, courts can
ensure that the Miranda analysis adequately accounts for the special
characteristics of children. Part V reflects on the viability of the
possible solutions discussed and concludes on the current status of
children in the evolving field of criminal law.

10. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261,
271–72 (2011).
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II. BACKGROUND: MIRANDA AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
One of the most polarizing areas of constitutional criminal
procedure is that relating to police interrogations and confessions.11
Longstanding arguments exist over how much merit and weight
should be assigned to confessions taken during a police
investigation.12 This is, in part, because the admission of a confession
in a criminal case can quickly become damning.13 Thus, constitutional
protections and specialized procedures govern when confessions may
be properly admitted into evidence.
A. Fifth Amendment Rights and Procedures
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against [her]self. . . .”14 It was this simple line that provided the
Supreme Court with a foundation for the now-iconic Miranda
warnings endlessly dramatized on television. Miranda v. Arizona,15
decided in 1966, held explicitly for the first time that under the Fifth
Amendment, a person can not be subject to a custodial interrogation
until she is explicitly informed of her rights.16 The Court held that the
Constitution protects an accused from being compelled to give
statements that are testimonial, incriminating, and compelled, and
guarantees the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.17 In short,
a typical Miranda warning is usually summarized as:
11. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., WEST’S CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.1(A) (4th ed. 2016) (“No area of constitutional criminal procedure has provoked
more debate over the years than that dealing with police interrogation.”).
12. Id. (“In large measure, the debate has centered upon two fundamental questions: (1) how
important are confessions in the process of solving crimes and convicting the perpetrators? and (2)
what is the extent and nature of police abuse in seeking to obtain confessions from those suspected
of crimes?”).
13. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (“A confession is like no other
evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging
evidence that can be admitted against him . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
16. Id. at 444. The origins of the Miranda rule first appeared in the seminal cases of (1) Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936), in which the U.S. Supreme court first struck down a
conviction because of the manner in which the defendant’s confession was obtained, and (2)
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484 (1964), in which a confession was suppressed because it
was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel at the time of interrogation. It also
affirmed the existence of an absolute right to remain silent. See LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7:3 (2016).
17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can
and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the
right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney one will
be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just
read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak
to me?18
Consequently, Miranda’s articulation of these constitutional
limitations on custodial police interrogations created new and
expansive protections for individual rights on which to build.19
In the years following Miranda, the landscape surrounding Fifth
Amendment rights was shaped extensively by the Supreme Court.
Modern Miranda analysis may be broken down into four distinct parts:
custody, interrogation, delivery, and waiver. While each of these
stages is integral to a full understanding of a Miranda analysis, the
most important as far as children are concerned are custody and waiver
because (1) both utilize some iteration of the totality of the
circumstances test, and (2) the Supreme Court has considered the
unique status of children at these stages.20
1. Miranda Analysis: Custody
The first question in determining whether a Miranda warning is
necessary asks whether the individual who is the target of police
attention is “in custody.”21 Determining whether an individual is in
custody is a critical part of the analysis because the purpose of
Miranda’s due process safeguards is to “protect the individual against
the coercive nature of custodial interrogation.”22 Miranda warnings
are only required where the police’s target is in custody; they do not
apply in noncustodial settings.23

18. Id. at 467–73; see also What Are Your Miranda Rights?, MIRANDA WARNING ,
http://www.mirandawarning.org/whatareyourmirandarights.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
20. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“This totality-of-the-circumstances
approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of
juveniles is involved.”); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 280 (2011) (“To be sure, th[e
totality of the circumstances] test permits consideration of a child’s age, and it erects its own barrier
to admission of a defendant’s inculpatory statements at trial.”).
21. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id.; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
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Whether a suspect is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is an
objective determination which consists of two inquiries.24 First, courts
must consider the “circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”25
Second, courts must consider whether “a reasonable person [would]
have felt [that] she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave” under those circumstances.26 The custody analysis requires no
subjective consideration of the suspect’s “actual mindset,”27 but looks
instead to the totality of the circumstances—an objective inquiry.28
Employing the totality test to determine whether a suspect was in
custody is the first stage of the Miranda analysis.
There is a myriad of case law illustrating the application of the
totality test to the Miranda custody analysis. In Orozco v. Texas,29 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that an individual was “in custody” where
he was awoken by four officers in his bedroom and “under arrest”
from the moment he gave his name.30 The Orozco Court flatly rejected
the state’s argument that Miranda should not apply because the
individual was interrogated on his own bed, in familiar surroundings.31
Alternatively, in Oregon v. Mathiason,32 the Court found that a
Miranda warning was not required where an individual confessed,
went voluntarily to a police station, and was immediately told that he
was not under arrest and could leave at any time.33 The Court sternly
emphasized that the custody analysis centers on whether the individual
is actually in custody, not simply whether the questioning took place
in a “coercive environment.”34

24. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270; see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662–63 (2004);
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)
(discussing stages of Miranda custody analysis).
25. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667.
28. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270–71 (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322) (“Rather than demarcate a
limited set of relevant circumstances, we have required police officers and courts to examine all of
the circumstances . . . including any. . . that would have affected how a reasonable person in the
suspects position would perceive her freedom to leave.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).
29. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
30. Id. at 325.
31. Id. at 326.
32. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
33. Id. at 495.
34. Id.
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Finally, Berkemer v. McCarty35 concerned an intoxicated
motorist who was pulled over for swerving, given a sobriety test, and
asked questions about whether he had used intoxicants; the motorist
answered in the affirmative.36 After the officer determined that the
motorist was heavily intoxicated, he placed him under arrest and
transported him to the county jail.37 The Court distinguished the
statements the motorist made on the roadside from those he made from
the county jail.38 It held that the roadside statements were admissible
because the motorist was not yet in custody for the purposes of
Miranda, but that the jail statements were inadmissible because the
motorist was in custody when he made them.39
The totality test as applied to the custody analysis is a factspecific but objective inquiry.40 There is no distinct setting required to
find that an individual is or is not in custody.41 As the above cases
illustrate, a suspect may be in custody when questioned in an informal
setting, such as her own bedroom, and may not be in custody when
questioned in a formal setting, such as a police station. It is easy to see
the benefits of such flexibility. The Supreme Court itself praised the
test’s objective component in J.D.B., stating, “The benefit of the
objective custody analysis is that it is ‘designed to give clear guidance
to the police.’”42 The Court elaborated:
By limiting analysis to the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, and asking how a reasonable person in the
[individual]’s
position
would
understand
[her
circumstances], the objective test avoids burdening police
with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every
individual suspect and divining how those particular traits
affect each person’s subjective state of mind.43
Thus, the Court strongly endorses the objective component of the
totality test for custody analysis.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)).
Id.
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2. Miranda Analysis: Interrogation
The second part of the Miranda analysis asks whether an
interrogation has occurred.44 While this stage of the Miranda analysis
does not rely on the totality test discussed above, the interrogation
analysis is nonetheless critical to the Miranda analysis. An
individual’s Miranda rights are triggered when she is in custody and
interrogated, or subjected to the “functional equivalent” of
interrogation.45 In Rhode Island v. Innis,46 the Court defined the
“functional equivalent” of interrogation as words or actions that a
reasonable police officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.47 This is essentially an
objective two-part test that considers both the “reasonable officer” and
“reasonable suspect” viewpoints.48
3. Miranda Analysis: Delivery
For purposes of Miranda, when an individual is taken into
custody and interrogated, she is subjected to a “custodial
interrogation.”49 At this point, any statements taken by the police
before giving the individual her Miranda warnings are taken in
violation of Miranda.50 The Court has emphasized that “the accused
must be adequately and effectively apprised of [her] rights and the
exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”51
4. Miranda Analysis: Waiver
The final part of the Miranda analysis looks at whether a valid
waiver occurred.52 Both the right to remain silent and the right to
consult with an attorney can be waived.53
44. See generally Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“It is clear therefore that
the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply
taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.”).
45. Id. at 300–01.
46. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
47. Id. at 301–02; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600–01 (1990) (explaining
what constitutes a “functional equivalent” of interrogation).
48. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301–02.
49. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Court defined “custodial
interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
50. Id. at 444–45.
51. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979).
52. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
53. Id.
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To be valid, a waiver must be knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily given.54 However, this does not translate into an explicit
waiver requirement:55 “An express written or oral statement of waiver
of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong
proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either
necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”56 It is at this stage of the
analysis that the totality test makes its return. Whether an individual
in a given case waived her rights must be determined by the “particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”57 This is the
same “totality” language applied in the Miranda custody analysis.58
North Carolina v. Butler59 clearly demonstrates how the totality
test applies to the Miranda waiver analysis. In Butler, an individual
accused of kidnapping, armed robbery of a gas station, and other
charges made incriminating statements to police after he was read his
Miranda rights.60 When asked if the individual understood his rights,
he responded that he did.61 He later refused to sign a waiver form, but
continued to speak with the police, stating “I will talk to you but I am
not signing any form.”62 The Court held that, in looking at the
surrounding circumstances of the case, the waiver was valid.63 The
Court emphatically rejected the proposal that the Miranda waiver
analysis required an explicit statement of waiver, finding that such a
per se rule would be far too inflexible for the delicate demands of
Miranda.64

54. Id. at 444 (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).
55. Butler, 441 U.S. at 375–76.
56. Id. at 373.
57. Id. at 374–75.
58. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)
(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)) (“The test is whether, considering the
totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.”).
59. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
60. Id. at 370.
61. Id. at 370–71.
62. Id. at 371.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 376 (“By creating an inflexible rule that no implicit waiver can ever suffice, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has gone beyond the requirements of federal organic law. It follows
that its judgment cannot stand, since a state court can neither add to nor subtract from the mandates
of the United States Constitution.”).
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A violation of the Miranda rules renders a suspect’s statement
inadmissible.65 “If [an] interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his” Miranda privileges.66 This rule has become
such a keystone of the American justice system that it applies to all
federal and state criminal cases, regardless of whether an individual is
detained on suspicion of a felony or a misdemeanor.67
5. The Purpose of Miranda
The general policy purposes behind Miranda and its
accompanying legal tests are well-explained in Withrow v. Williams.68
In Withrow, the Court stated that “a system of criminal law
enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system
relying on independent investigation.”69 Miranda requirements are not
intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in
investigating crime; rather, they are intended to protect individuals
from coercive interrogation methods.70
The Miranda Court elaborated on these concerns extensively.71 It
observed that “[i]nterrogation . . . takes place in privacy. Privacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our
knowledge . . . .”72 The Court cited training manuals used regularly by
officers: “[T]he principal psychological factor contributing to a
successful interrogation is privacy–being alone with the person under
interrogation.”73 The Court also pointed to how these manuals instruct
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
66. Id. at 475 (“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained
or appointed counsel.”).
67. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432 (1984). The Miranda rule was reaffirmed as
recently as 2000 by the U.S. Supreme Court in an opinion which held that Miranda is a
constitutional decision which cannot be overturned by congressional statute. Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
68. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
69. Id. at 693 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n. 23 (1974)).
70. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448, 477.
71. Id. at 445–56.
72. Id. at 448.
73. Id. at 449 (citing FRED E. INABU & JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 1 (1962)). The Court also expressed concern over the tactics advised by these
manuals, which included “display[ing] an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt,” “direct[ing]
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interrogators to dismiss and discourage explanations contrary to guilt
and sometimes even instruct to “induce a confession out of trickery.”74
The need for Miranda’s protections were thus obvious to the Court,
and subsequent cases in the areas of both custody and waiver analysis
deemed the “totality of the circumstances” test adequate to guarantee
those protections.
B. Fifth Amendment Rights and Procedures for Children
In the years since Miranda v. Arizona, it has become apparent that
the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence has failed to adequately
protect children. Current California law allows a police officer to take
children under 18 years old into custody where the officer has
reasonable cause to believe the minor has committed a crime or
violated an order of the juvenile court.75 Although federal law still
requires police to read a child her Miranda rights prior to subjecting
her to custodial interrogation,76 the application of the protections
discussed above still generally apply to children in the same manner
as to adults. This remains the case, despite a clear struggle in the courts
with this policy.77 As a result, the U.S and California Supreme Courts
have already tinkered with the application of the totality test as applied
to children in three specific cases.
1. The Totality Test in the Miranda Waiver Analysis:
Fare v. Michael C. (1979)
In In re Michael C.,78 the California Supreme Court attempted to
institute extra protection for children within the Miranda waiver
analysis. There, sixteen-and-a-half year old Michael C. (“Michael”)
was taken into police custody on suspicion of murder.79 After being
comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than . . . whether he did it,”
“minimiz[ing] the moral seriousness of the offense,” and “cast[ing] blame on the victim or on
society.” Id. at 450.
74. Id. at 450, 453.
75. S.B. 395, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). In Haley, the Court recognized that a
15-year-old child suspected of murder was more deserving of heightened protections from the
overpowering presence of police during custodial interrogation. The court stated that “[w]hat
transpired would make us pause . . . if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere
chil—an easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.”
Id.
78. 579 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1978).
79. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 709–10 (1979).
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read his Miranda rights, Michael asked to see his probation officer.80
When police denied his request, Michael then agreed to speak with
them without consulting an attorney.81 Unsurprisingly, Michael then
proceeded to make statements incriminating himself in the murder.82
During criminal proceedings, Michael moved to suppress the
statements, alleging that they were obtained in violation of Miranda.83
He argued that his request to see his probation officer “constituted an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, just as if he
had requested the assistance of an attorney.”84 Although the California
Supreme Court accepted this argument, the U.S. Supreme Court
ultimately rejected it.85
The California Supreme Court held that Michael’s probation
officer would act to protect the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights in the
same way an attorney would act, and thus found Michael’s request for
his probation officer to be a per se invocation of his Miranda rights.86
The California Supreme Court did not apply the totality test, finding
essentially that the circumstances surrounding the interrogation were
inconsequential to the analysis if Michael had in fact invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege by asking for his probation officer.87
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, disapproved of California’s
per se rule, and focused instead on the distinctions between probation
officers and attorneys.88 Specifically, the Court took issue with what
it saw as the California Supreme Court’s assertion that to a child, a
probation officer might play a similar role as an attorney might to an
adult.89 The Court held: “[I]t cannot be said that the probation officer
is able to offer the type of independent advice that an accused would
expect from a lawyer retained or assigned to assist him during

80. Id. at 710.
81. Id. at 710–11.
82. Id. at 711.
83. Id. at 711–12.
84. Id. In making this argument, Fare relied on a previous California Supreme Court decision,
People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793 (1971), which held that a minor’s request made during custodial
interrogation to see his parents constituted an invocation of the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Fare, 442 U.S. at 712.
85. Id. at 707.
86. Id. at 714–15.
87. Id. (“Here, however, we face conduct which, regardless of considerations of capacity,
coercion or voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.”).
88. Id. at 707–08.
89. Id. at 722.
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questioning.”90 Rather than consider the situation from the perspective
of the child, the Court instead focused its analysis on what type of
services Michael’s probation officer would be able to provide him.91
The Supreme Court reiterated its stance on the totality test,
insisting that “this totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate
to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation
of juveniles is involved.”92 Fare remains the controlling case for
Miranda waiver analysis regarding children.
2. The Totality Test in the Miranda Custody Analysis:
J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011)
Three decades passed before the U.S. Supreme Court
meaningfully revisited the question of whether it should institute any
extra protection for children under Miranda—this time specifically
under the Miranda custody analysis. Until mid-2011, courts applied
the same Miranda custody analysis in cases where the defendant was
a child as in cases where the defendant was an adult.93 Then, in J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, the Court articulated how this part of the Miranda
analysis should differ when the defendant is under 18 years old.94 At
the center of this “new” interpretation was the totality test.
In J.D.B., a 13-year-old boy (“J.D.B.”) suspected of burglary
challenged the Court to consider whether the age of a child subjected
to police questioning is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis.95 In
Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion, the answer was a muddy “sort
of.” The Court held that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda
custody analysis, so long as the child’s age was known to the officer
at the time of questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to
a reasonable officer.96 The Court reasoned that:
In some circumstances, a child’s age would have affected
how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would
perceive his or her freedom to leave. That is, a reasonable
child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 721.
Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 725.
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 274.
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pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free
to go.97
The Court made clear, however, that this addition to the custody
analysis was a subtle one: “We think it clear that courts can account
for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the
custody analysis.”98
J.D.B. thus took a major step toward protecting children’s Fifth
Amendment rights by explicitly requiring courts to consider a child’s
age where her age was reasonably apparent to the officer at the time
she was questioned or would have been to a reasonable officer. It
remains the leading case on applying custody analysis to children.
Although distinctions exist between the custody and waiver
analysis, both rely on the totality test to fairly protect defendants of all
ages. Yet, this is unreasonable because the purported objective nature
of the totality test is inherently at odds with the need to consider the
uniquely vulnerable nature of children. While J.D.B. valiantly
attempted to harmonize the two, In re Joseph H., decided four years
later, clearly demonstrates why the issue cannot be resolved without a
more radical solution.
C. Reaffirming the Totality Test Analysis in the
Miranda Waiver Context: In re Joseph H.
In 2015, the California Supreme Court again had the opportunity
to address the special characteristics of children in a waiver context.
In In re Joseph H., 10-year-old Joseph was questioned by police in the
presence of his mother, but without the assistance of counsel.99 During
his interrogation, he admitted to shooting his heavily abusive, neoNazi father.100 Despite his objection to this evidence, the Superior
Court of Riverside County found the confession admissible; Joseph H.
was sentenced to serve 10 years in a California juvenile facility for
second-degree murder—a sentence equal to Joseph’s entire life as of
that time.101
97. Id. at 271–72.
98. Id. at 272.
99. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 177–78 (Ct. App. 2015).
100. Id. at 178.
101. Kristine Phillips, ‘I Shot Dad’: The Tragic Case of a Child Who Killed His Abusive, NeoNazi Father, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2016/08/26/i-shot-dad-the-tragic-case-of-a-child-who-killed-his-abusive-neo-nazifather/?utm_term=.70d63e887cbd.
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The California Court of Appeal upheld Joseph’s conviction,
applying the totality test outlined in Fare.102 It held that Joseph’s
confession was admissible because “Joseph’s responses indicated he
understood his Miranda rights and that he validly waived his rights
despite his young age, his ADHD [attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder], and below average intelligence.”103 It added that Joseph’s
response to the question of whether he understood his right to remain
silent did not sufficiently demonstrate that he did not knowingly and
understandingly waive his rights.104
After the California Supreme Court denied review, (in the face of
a 3-justice dissent written by California Supreme Court Justice Liu),
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.105
III. THE COURTS’ CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY TEST
FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR CHILDREN’S UNIQUE VULNERABILITIES
The totality test analysis, as described above, is incomplete
because it lacks critical fail safes to ensure the protection of minors.
The Court’s continued contention that, as applied, it always fully
accounts for the distinctive characteristics of children as a subgroup is
based on a theoretical analysis that borders on illusory. The actual
results of the courts’ analyses in cases involving children have
sometimes yielded absurd outcomes, revealing that children are
indeed falling through the cracks. There is no better evidence for this
than the stories of sixteen-year-old Michael, thirteen-year-old J.D.B.,
and of course, 10-year-old Joseph.
A. Fare v. Michael C.: A Lacking Analysis Under the Totality Test
The Court’s totality test analysis is most flawed in its application
of the waiver analysis to children. In Fare, the Court began by
explaining why it maintained such confidence in the totality test’s
ability to protect children:
We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach
[than the totality test] is required where the question is
whether a juvenile has waived [her] rights, as opposed to
102. Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 185.
103. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.; H v. California, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/h-vcalifornia/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
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whether an adult has done so. [This approach] permits—
indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to
understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those
rights.106
In addition to these considerations, the Court also cited the “special
expertise” of juvenile courts as yet another reason why the totality test
appropriately considers “those special concerns that are present when
young persons, often with limited experience and education and with
immature judgment, are involved.”107
Yet, there is a clear disconnect between the theory outlined above
and the actual application of the test. In Fare, the Court ultimately held
that Michael had in fact properly waived his rights.108 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court purported to consider the factors it had described
earlier in its opinion: “age,” “experience,” “education,” “background,”
“intelligence,” and “comprehension.”109 In weighing these factors, the
Court found that the interrogating officers had taken care to “ensure
[the child] understood his rights.”110 The Court specifically stated that
there was “no indication [the child] was of insufficient intelligence to
understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that
waiver would be.”111
Additionally, the Fare Court held that “no special factors
indicate[d] that [the child] was unable to understand the nature of his
actions.”112 To support this, the Court first pointed to Michael’s age
(sixteen-and-a-half) and his “considerable experience with the
police.”113 Next, in considering whether there was any “indication that
[the child] was of sufficient intelligence to understand the rights he
was waiving, or . . . the consequences of that waiver,” the Court
106. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 726.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 726–27.
113. Id. at 726 (“[The child] had a record of several arrests. He had served time in a youth camp,
and he had been on probation for several years. He was under the full-time supervision of probation
authorities.”).
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offered a thin analysis that was conclusory at best.114 It found no
indication that Michael “was of insufficient intelligence to understand
[his] rights.”115 Finally, in considering the behavior of the officers and
the nature of the interrogation itself, the Court concluded that Michael
“was not worn down by improper . . . tactics or lengthy questioning or
by trickery or deceit.”116
The analysis set out above is an excellent example of the issues
that arise when the totality test is applied to children without some
direct consideration of what it means to be a child. The Court gave
only a cursory examination of certain critical factors benefitting
Michael C., while inappropriately placing more weight on factors that
benefit law enforcement. The Court also ignored other significant
evidence altogether. For example, the Court gave great weight to the
officers’ explanation of Miranda rights and held that from this
explanation, Michael undoubtedly understood what he had been
told.117 However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court was neither
required nor encouraged to consider the remainder of the transcripts
or the fact that sixteen-year-olds generally do not have exposure to the
intricacies of the law. The Court seemed to refuse to consider the
implications of being arrested at such a young age. In fact, the Court
seemed to impose a higher expectation on Michael to understand his
rights because of his previous history with law enforcement.118 The
Court also failed to address how a sixteen-year-old might respond to
police interrogation tactics as compared to an adult. Had the Court
given proper weight to these other “circumstances,” this case would
likely have resulted in a different outcome.
Perhaps the most glaring issue with the Court’s application of the
totality test is its failure to address a certain exchange between Michael
and the officers altogether, which clearly indicated that Michael did
not understand his right to legal counsel.119 That conversation between
Michael and an officer appeared in the transcripts as follows:

114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 726–27.
117. Id. at 726 (“The transcript of the interrogation reveals that the police officers conducting
the interrogation took care to ensure that [the child] understood his rights. They fully explained to
[the child] that he was being questioned . . . then informed him of all the rights delineated in
Miranda, and ascertained that [he] understood.”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 710–11.
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Q: Do you understand these rights as I have explained them
to you?
A: Yeah.
Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent
and talk to us about this murder?
A: What murder? I don’t know about no murder.
Q: I’ll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us
about it.
A: Yeah, I might talk to you.
Q: Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney
present here while we talk about it?
A: Can I have my probation officer here?
Q: Well I can’t get a hold of your probation officer right now.
You have the right to an attorney.
A: How I know you guys won’t pull no police officer in and
tell me he’s an attorney?120
There are several indicators here that demonstrate Michael had no idea
what Miranda rights were or what they guaranteed. Again, however,
in its analysis under the totality test, the Court strangely stated that
there was “no indication in the record that [Michael] failed to
understand what the officers told him.”121 The transcript of his
interrogation, however, tells a different story.
To begin, Michael failed to answer any of the questions regarding
his rights decisively.122 Although a proper waiver does not require
explicit language, the totality of the circumstances must still indicate
that it was “knowing and voluntary” for it to be valid.123 Based on
Michael’s responses, it is difficult to see how the Court believed he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. In fact, the most
concerning portion of this transcript, in which Michael asks, “How I
know you guys won’t pull no police officer in and tell me he’s an
attorney?”, strongly indicates Michael’s limited understanding of his
rights.124 He clearly believed that police investigators could

120. Id.
121. Id. at 726.
122. Id. at 710–11.
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,
375–76 (1979).
124. Fare, 442 U.S. at 710–11.
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impersonate an attorney, and did not comprehend that he held a
Constitutional right to counsel.
Further, it is obvious from this exchange that Michael wished for
some form of assistance when he requested his probation officer.125
While the Court made clear that this did not adequately trigger
Michael’s Fifth Amendment rights, it was also not considered by the
Court as one of the “circumstances” in this case.126 Other than to deny
the California Supreme Court’s per se probation officer rule, the Court
did not consider Michael’s request for a familiar face relevant here.127
In addition to ignoring the above transcripts, the Court also
generally seemed to dismiss the fact that Michael was only sixteen
years old and had no basic understanding of criminal law. In Fare,
Justice Powell argued in his dissent that the majority opinion should
certainly have considered Michael’s age in its application of the
totality test.128 He explained that, although Michael “had prior brushes
with the law[,] . . . the taped interrogation—as well as his testimony at
the suppression hearing—demonstrates that he was immature,
emotional, and uneducated, and therefore was likely to be vulnerable
to the skillful, two-on-one repetitive style of interrogation to which he
was subjected.”129 Oddly, however, as mentioned above, the majority
seemed to attach considerable weight to Michael’s history with law
enforcement in its evaluation of his understanding of Miranda.130
Seeming to imply a correlation between interactions with the police
and an up-to-date knowledge of Constitutional rights, the Court
unfairly penalized Michael for his past.131
Finally, the Court rejected Michael’s argument that the police
pressured him into cooperating and providing incriminating
statements. 132 In applying the totality test, the Court declared that “the
officers did not intimidate or threaten [Michael] in any way. . . their
questioning was restrained and free from abuses that so concerned the
Court in Miranda.”133 The Court was unpersuaded by Michael’s

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.
See generally Fare, 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 726 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id.
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arguments that the police had threatened him, ignored his pleas to stop
talking, and continued after he expressed fear by starting to cry.134
The Fare Court’s application of the totality test not only
demonstrates how the test can fail to sufficiently consider those
characteristics most crucial in a juvenile case, but even worse, it shows
how easily subjectivity can saturate the current analysis to eliminate a
meaningful consideration of age altogether. The same story was
repeated in In Re Joseph H.
B. In re Joseph H.: A Continued Misapplication of the Totality Test
The Joseph H. court held that, from “all the surrounding
circumstances,” Joseph knowingly and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights.135 Yet, the California Court of Appeal’s analysis also
applied the totality test in the same flawed manner.136 The courts again
failed to give proper weight to the factor most significant to children
as a class: age. As in Fare, the Joseph H. court ignored a troubling
transcript of a conversation between the police and Joseph. It too
stated that “the record does not support the minor’s assertion that
[Joseph’s] hesitation, confusion and misunderstanding of the full
scope of what it meant to ‘waive’ his rights, showed
involuntariness.”137 This language is eerily reminiscent of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Fare.138
The transcript, which the California Court of Appeal omitted
from its majority opinion, is telling of Joseph’s lack of understanding
of his rights in the same way it was in Fare:
Q: Okay. Now I’m going to read you something and it’s–it’s
called your Miranda Rights. And, I know you don’t
understand really what that is. But, that’s why your mom’s
here. Okay? . . .
A: Yeah.
Q: All right. So, you have the right to remain silent. You
know what that means?
134. Id.
135. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 186–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
136. Id. at 186 (“On appeal, the determination of a trial court as to the ultimate issue of the
voluntariness of a confession is reviewed independently in light of the record in its entirety,
including all the surrounding circumstances.”).
137. Id. at 187.
138. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 726 (“There is no indication in the record that [Michael] failed to
understand what the officers told him [about his Miranda rights].”).
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A: Yes, that means that I have the right to stay calm.
Q: That means y-you do not have to talk to me.
A: Right.139
This response should have been an obvious signal that a knowing
and voluntary waiver did not occur. As admitted by the officer herself,
Joseph had no understanding of his Miranda rights.140
The Joseph H. court also placed a significantly higher weight on
factors benefitting law enforcement than on those favoring children.
The Joseph H. court stated that it was not persuaded by Joseph’s
“age,” “the fact that he suffers from ADHD,” and “other mental
disabilities,” because “the detective repeatedly asked Joseph if he
understood what she was explaining about his rights, and when he
demonstrated
misunderstanding,
she
provided
additional
explanation.”141 It stated that “Joseph’s responses indicated he
understood,” and that “nothing in the record supports the premise that
he was confused or suggestible.”142
The Joseph H. court further explained why, under the totality test,
Joseph’s actions constituted a legal waiver. It first pointed to the fact
that Joseph had his stepmother “for support” in deciding whether to
waive his rights by speaking with police.143 It then cited Joseph’s show
of “guilt for what he had done” as a second reason why Joseph
“decided” to waive his rights.144
Given the unique facts of Joseph H., it is bizarre that the outcome
and opinion in this case are nearly identical to those in Fare.145 These
similarities raise serious doubts about the courts’ analysis under the
totality test because it continually fails to give proper weight to a
child’s age. Michael C. and Joseph H. demonstrate how an incomplete
application of the totality test in the Miranda waiver analysis can
seriously endanger the rights of children. While the totality test would
be a useful strategy in situations where the childhood factor is
139. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting). The transcript was cited by
California Supreme Court Justice Liu in his dissenting opinion to the decision denying review of
Joseph H.
140. Id.
141. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
142. Id.
143. Surprisingly, the court did not consider this a conflict of interest, despite the fact that
Joseph’s stepmother was newly widowed because Joseph had just shot and killed her husband. Id.
144. Id. at 187.
145. See Phillips, supra note 101. This same case produced headlines such as, “‘I Shot Dad’:
The Tragic Case of a Child Who Killed His Abusive, Neo-Nazi Father.” Id.
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appropriately accounted for, as it stands now, its inherent openness to
subjective application makes it a poor tool for use in safeguarding
children’s Miranda rights. The totality test requires that the courts
consider all of the circumstances, but, as explained above, that is
clearly not what is occurring when it is actually applied to minors.
Thus, this test’s analysis requires more guidance and specificity when
considering the actions of children.
C. J.D.B.: Improving the Totality Test Analysis by
Directly Accounting for Age
While J.D.B. is admittedly far more realistic about the differences
between adults and children, it still does not fully accomplish the
protections such a class deserves. 146
In the majority opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court
held that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody
analysis.147 This is significant because prior to J.D.B., age was not
explicitly considered under the totality test custody analysis.148 The
majority opinion openly reflected on the Court’s duty to protect
children because of their unique status.149 Further, it acknowledged the
difficulties of applying the test to children without considering how
they differ from adults. The Court candidly stated: “[T]he dissent
insists that the clarity of the custody analysis will be destroyed unless
a ‘one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test’ applies. In reality, however,
ignoring a juvenile defendant’s age will often make the inquiry more
artificial, and thus only add confusion.”150 The Court went on to
explain the absurd and paradoxical implications of applying the
totality test without taking age into consideration:
[J.D.B.] is a prime example. Were the court precluded from
taking J.D.B.’s youth into account, it would be forced to
evaluate the circumstances present here through the eyes of
a reasonable person of average years. In other words, how
would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after being
146. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011) (holding that age should be directly
considered in the Miranda custody analysis, but only where the child’s age is known or reasonably
apparent).
147. Id. at 265.
148. See id. at 278.
149. See generally id. at 272–80 (discussing the inherent vulnerabilities of children as
compared to adults).
150. Id. at 279.
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removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a
uniformed school resources officer . . . ?151
Although the Court recognized the futility of applying the totality
test to children without accounting for age, it did not go far enough.
The Court reiterated that it now requires that age be considered under
the totality test in a Miranda custody analysis; however, it did not
entirely elaborate on how this solves the aforementioned tension.152 It
simply stated that this new requirement did not create a further
conflict.153 Thus, even J.D.B., with all its reflection on the
fundamental differences between adults and children,154 did not
wholly repair the subjective nature of the analysis. The Court qualified
its holding by stating: “this is not to say that a child’s age will be a
determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case.”155
D. Modern Studies of Juvenile Development Support Giving a
Child’s Age More Weight Under the Totality Test
As illustrated in the case law above, the totality test, as applied
now, is failing to assign appropriate weight to a child-suspect’s age.
Contemporary science supports the assertion that age should be a far
more significant factor under the totality test.
Today, the scientific community has supplied the legal
community with a substantial amount of research showing that
children’s brains are in a fundamentally different developmental stage
than those of adults. This research demonstrates that the prefrontal
cortex, a region of the brain just behind the forehead, controls
judgment, problem-solving, decision-making, and the regulation of
impulsive behavior.156 Research further shows that the prefrontal
cortex does not fully develop in humans until the early twenties.157
151. Id. at 275–76.
152. Id. at 271–72.
153. Id. at 277 (“We hold that so long as the child’s age was known . . . or would have been
objectively apparent . . . its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature
of that [totality] test.”).
154. See, e.g., id. at 281 (“To hold, as the State requests, that a child’s age is never relevant to
whether a suspect has been taken into custody—and thus to ignore the very real differences between
children and adults—would be to deny children the full scope of the procedural safeguards
that Miranda guarantees to adults.”).
155. Id. at 277.
156. Megan Crane et al., The Truth About Juvenile False Confessions, AM. B. ASS’N: INSIGHTS
ON L. AND SOC’Y (Winter 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_
andsociety/16/winter2016/JuvenileConfessions.html.
157. Id.
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Critically, this timeline makes a juvenile’s capacities and behaviors
inherently less developed than those of full-grown adults.158 Scientists
have demonstrated that this difference disadvantages juveniles
because it results in a propensity toward impulsivity, underdeveloped
cognitive capacities critical for information processing, difficulty
weighing options and making complex decisions, and a tendency to
over-emphasize potential short-term gains over possible long-term
consequences.159 Thus, science tells us, it is extremely unfair to ask
children to make such paramount legal decisions because they are
often unable to fully realize the consequences of their actions.160
The scientific principles outlined above also shed light on why,
ethically, children should not be penalized for making irrational
decisions concerning Miranda waivers on their own. The
developmental differences between children and adults underscore the
common-sense concern that children are more susceptible to outside
influences and peer pressure. This makes them far more likely to fold
under the stresses of custodial interrogation, waive their rights, and
provide potentially false confessions.161 It has also been shown that
younger children under the age of thirteen are particularly at risk of
not understanding their rights.162
This high rate of waiver also suggests a high rate of false
confessions among those under 18. While extremely difficult to
quantify, studies have concluded that the rate of false confessions for
children lies somewhere between fourteen and twenty-five percent.163
The U.S. Supreme Court itself has cited a study of false confessions,
which found that out of 125 proven false confessions, sixty-three

158. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANNUAL REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 53–59 (2009) (expanded discussion of the cognitive and psychosocial
development of the adolescent brain).
159. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Emerging Findings from Research on
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 7 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 428 (2012).
160. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (referring to a child in the context of
confessions as an “easy victim of the law”).
161. Crane et al., supra note 156.
162. Brief for Juvenile Law Center & The Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re Joseph H., 137 S. Ct. 34 (No. 15-1086) [hereinafter Brief for
Juvenile Law Center] (citing Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension
of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants: A Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 1, 2, 9 (2007)).
163. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 907 (2004).
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percent were from individuals under the age of twenty-five and thirtyfive percent were from individuals under the age of 18.164
Finally, children simply lack the basic education necessary to
understand a Miranda warning. An examination of the traditional
Miranda language makes clear that it is unreasonable to expect minors
to comprehend the warning at a level necessary for an adequate
waiver. A careful look at the standard language of the warning reveals
a long, complex sentence structure that requires more advanced
reading levels to comprehend fully:
“I have the right to an attorney.” (4th grade; comprised of
seven words.)
“I have the right to the presence of a lawyer and to talk with
a lawyer before and during any questioning.” (10th grade;
comprised of 21 words.)
“I have the right to hire an attorney and have her present
prior to and during any interview and questioning by peace
officers or attorneys representing the state. I may have
reasonable time and opportunity to consult with my attorney
if I desire.” (12th grade; comprised of 45 words.)165
As most children do not turn 18 until they reach the twelfth grade
and graduate high school, it follows that most children who encounter
Miranda warnings have not yet even had the opportunity to learn the
language skills necessary to comprehend the warning in its entirety.
Presumably, educators do not expect students to read above their grade
levels, so it is impractical to demand such performance in this context.
Thus, the takeaway here is that critical legal decisions like
waiving Miranda rights are simply not compatible with a child or
adolescent’s capacity for decision-making, and forcing a child to do
so is unfair at best and cruelly irresponsible at worst.

164. See Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 21, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (No. 09-11121); see also Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320–21 (2009) (“[C]ustodial police interrogation by its very nature,
isolates and pressures the individual . . . and there is mounting empirical evidence that these
pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never
committed.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
165. Eric Y. Drogin & Richard Rogers, Juveniles and Miranda: Current Research and the Need
to Reform How Children Are Advised of Their Rights, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2015, at 14.

RODRIGUEZ_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/15/19 8:37 PM

2018] THE “PRODUCT OF CHILDHOOD” UNDER MIRANDA

673

IV. PROPOSAL: THE TOTALITY TEST SHOULD INCLUDE A
DIRECT “PRODUCT OF CHILDHOOD” INQUIRY FOR CASES
CONCERNING CHILDREN
Taking into consideration the above critique, children require
further protection when it comes to preserving their Miranda rights.
This could be accomplished in several ways.
A. A Legislative Solution: SB 1052 and SB 395
An obvious source of action could be the California legislature.
Where California and federal courts have failed to implement
enduring and effective change, the California legislature should fill the
void. However, the legislative process is imperfect, and is often
susceptible to public pressure,166 bureaucratic pitfalls, tit-for-tat
negotiation, and of course, the gubernatorial veto.167
The state legislature has in fact already attempted to fully address
the issue of Miranda rights for children. In response to Joseph H.,
California State Senators Ricardo Lara and Holly Mitchell proposed
Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”), a law intended to consider the newly
discovered developmental and neurological science surrounding the
capacity of those under 18.168 The Bill’s authors hoped to add three
distinct provisions to section 625.6 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, with the primary effect of requiring that children under 18
consult with an attorney before either waiving Miranda rights or being
subjected to a custodial interrogation.169 However, the Bill was vetoed
by Governor Brown in 2016.170
The following year, a new version of the bill, Senate Bill 395
(“SB 395”), was introduced in the California legislature.171 This 2.0
version was ultimately passed and signed into law on October 14,
166. See, e.g., Simpson v. Mun. Court, 92 Cal. Rptr 417, 421 (Ct. App. 1971) (“[T]he judicial
process repels the intervention of external opinion while the legislative process stands in need of
it.”).
167. See generally Lifecycle of a Bill, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON LEGIS. OF CAL.,
http://www.fclca.org/news-a-resources/lifecycle-of-a-bill.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
168. S.B. 1052, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
169. Id.
170. The uncertainty of the full consequences of SB 1052 were cited as reasons by Governor
Brown for his veto: “I am not prepared to put into law SB 1052’s categorical requirement that
juveniles consult an attorney before waiving their Miranda rights. Frankly, we need a much fuller
understanding of the ramifications of this measure.” See Bill Status: S.B. 1052 Custodial
Interrogation, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient
.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052.
171. S.B. 395, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
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2017.172 Although it consists of almost precisely the same language as
SB 1052, SB 395 contains one crucial distinction—it only protects
those minors aged 15 or younger.173 While this lowered age is surely
devastating for advocates of juvenile rights, a deconstruction of SB
395’s individual provisions demonstrates that the bill will still provide
major protections for younger children and possibly also provide the
legislature with valuable insight for future policy.
For example, subsection (a) of SB 395 reads:
Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of
any Miranda rights, a youth 15 years of age or younger shall
consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by
video conference. The consultation may not be waived.174
Subsection (a) states that minors “shall consult with legal counsel”
prior to interrogation or waiver.175 This use of “shall” clearly indicates
that a legal consultation would be mandatory under this addition. The
proposed language further supports this by including that
“consultation may not be waived.”176 The effect of this provision is to
protect children from any of the demonstrably coercive environments
and tactics used by law enforcement. By not allowing anyone—
guardian, officer, or other—to influence the accused child into
waiving her Miranda rights, SB 395 offers significantly more
protection, and, for that matter, clarity, than the totality test currently
laid out by the Court.
Although subsection (a) ensures some form of general legal
consultation for young children, its design is still a cause for some
concern. First, the flexibility provided by allowing a consultation to
take place by phone or video conference may come at a cost. Face-toface counsel has the best chance of ensuring that the attorney’s
directives are adequately followed. It is foreseeable that technical
difficulties or bad connections, rushed communications, or most
simply, forgetful children, can counterbalance any productive work
contributed by the attorney from afar. For example, one can conceive
of a situation where, after speaking with an attorney, the child would

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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walk back into the interrogation room and immediately forget his
attorney’s advice in the presence of another more intimidating adult.
Additionally, this provision raises a separate concern that the law
could be used as an excuse to hold children more accountable because
they will have already had an opportunity to consult with an attorney.
While such a provision will likely lower rates of self-incriminating
statements given by children in general due to adequate counsel, it is
also foreseeable that courts might become more hesitant to exclude
confessions made after this statutorily-mandated counsel visit occurs.
Subsection (b) instructs courts on the consequences of failing to
provide counsel prior to waiver or interrogation:
(b) The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of
statements of a youth 15 years of age or younger made during
or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of
failure to comply with subdivision (a).177
The bill proposed that courts “shall. . . consider” the effect of a failure
to comply with the legal consultation requirement (“representation
rule”).178 It is unclear how such a vague enforcement clause will
operate, and whether or not it will serve as a positive or a negative
addition to the rules surrounding children and Miranda. Despite
requiring that courts “consider” the effects of a failure to comply with
the representation rule, such language is highly suggestive of a
discretionary enforcement measure rather than a bright line rule
excluding inappropriately conducted interviews and waivers. This
language raises important questions about consistency and
enforcement. In a sense, the “shall. . . consider” language essentially
transforms the requirements of SB 395 into yet another iteration of the
totality test analysis, as a court considering non-compliance with the
statute is apparently free to disregard it if it so chooses (or, more
precisely, if other circumstances are more persuasive).
The interpretation of such broad language would directly
influence the behavior of officers. If interpreted narrowly, subsection
(b) could strictly enforce the representation rule while still allowing
judges some flexibility in their decisions. Interpreting subsection (b)
narrowly would be a best-case scenario, where courts would generally
suppress statements made without legal consultation. This
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id.
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interpretation would incentivize investigators to abide by the
representation rule. The opposite is true as well. If courts interpret the
language broadly, and exercised their discretion often to admit
inappropriately-collected statements, investigators would be less
cautious and would treat the representation rule more like a
technicality. In other words, depending on how the rule is enforced,
investigators would be incentivized to follow it either loosely or
diligently.
Subsection (c) of SB 395 includes an exception arguably more
troubling than the malleability of subsection (b):
(c) This section does not apply . . . if both of the following
criteria are met:
(1) The officer who questioned the youth reasonably believed
the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life
or property from an imminent threat.
(2) The officer’s questions were limited to those questions
that were reasonably necessary to obtain that information.179
Subsection (c) exempts police from following the representation rule
in certain emergency situations, subject only to a limited restriction on
the types of questions permitted.180 Much like subsection (b), the
potential for abuse with a provision like this is high and dependent
almost entirely on the courts’ interpretation and analysis. A rough
analogy can be drawn to the court-created exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which some have argued have swallowed the rule.181
As promising as the original SB 1052 might have been, the
reintroduction and lower age compromise of SB 395 is a testament to
the potential pitfalls of a legislative solution. Part of this reality is that
some are more concerned about impeding the investigations of law

179. Id. (emphasis added). Part (d) of the proposed addition to § 625.6 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code omitted above stated, “This section does not require a probation officer to comply
with subdivision (a) in the normal performance of his or her duties under Section 625, 627.5, or
628.”
180. Id.
181. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 569 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court does
not expressly disavow the warrant presumption . . . but its decision suggests that the exceptions
have all but swallowed the general rule.”); see also Kendra Hillman Chilcoat, The Automobile
Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v. White, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 917, 950 (2000)
(discussing the effects of Supreme Court precedent on the warrant requirement).
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enforcement than abusing the constitutional rights of children.182 A
true working legislative solution would thus have to be able to address
these competing interests.
B. A Bold Judicial Solution: A Bright Line Age Rule
The next obvious source for a solution is the California court
system. One option for California courts is to implement a bright line
rule for children in the Miranda context. As discussed above, this
would not be the first time California attempted something of this
nature. Fare revolved around the U.S. Supreme Court reversing the
California Supreme Court’s creation of a per se rule regarding a child’s
invocation of his right to an attorney.183
Such a bright line rule might, for example, articulate an age limit
on the ability to waive a Miranda warning in a “knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary” manner.184 Imposing a per se rule of this kind would
ensure that inappropriately induced confessions, and particularly false
confessions, by children under a specific age would never appear
before a jury.
While this appears to be an attractive option, as with the
legislative approach, the bright-line rule strategy is also accompanied
by one major criticism. Namely, if the court were to delineate an age
limit as described above, it would necessarily exclude a considerable
fraction of children above that age from the additional layer of
protection. This is not to say that the overall effect would not be
positive, however. It would simply be that children over the age limit
would remain subject to the same totality test as before, while
bolstering existing protections for the youngest of an already
vulnerable category. (As is also be the case under SB 395). A rule like

182. Governor Brown’s veto message regarding SB 1052 is informative: “Recent studies . . .
argue that juveniles are more vulnerable than adults and easily succumb to police pressure to talk
instead of remaining silent. Other studies show a much higher percentage of false confessions in
the case of juveniles . . . On the other hand, in countless cases, police investigators solve very
serious crimes through questioning and the resulting admissions or statements that follow. These
competing realities raise difficult and troubling issues . . . .” Bill Status: S.B. 1052 Custodial
Interrogation, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient
.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052.
183. See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
184. California Supreme Court Justice Liu indicated as much in his opinion dissenting in the
court’s decision to decline to hear Joseph H., outlining the value of considering “whether there is
an age below which the concept of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver has no meaningful
application . . . .” In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 4 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting).
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this could, however, act as a strong first step toward establishing that
children in general cannot truly comprehend Miranda rights.
Despite the potential of a bright line age rule, the fate of the
California Supreme Court’s per se rule in Fare is discouraging, and it
is possible such an approach would have a difficult time surviving the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The most effective strategy at their disposal would thus be for the
California courts to draw from other areas of law that have already
more readily embraced the science and psychology of child brain
development to perfect the existing rule regarding children and their
Miranda rights.
C. Another Judicial Solution: A “Product of Childhood”
Inquiry Under the Totality Test
First, borrowing from the special education context, federal law
requires that children not be held responsible when a disruption arises
out of or results from a child’s disability.185 Under Title 20 of the U.S.
Code, if a child with a disability violates a code of student conduct and
a school attempts to discipline the child or change her education
placement, a specialized procedure known as a “manifestation
determination” is triggered.186 An inquiry is made into the source of
the violation of school code, and if it is determined that the conduct
resulting in the violation was “caused by, or had a direct and
substantial relationship to, the child’s disability,” the school’s
disciplinary measures are rescinded and a more specialized plan to
address the behavior is implemented.187
Similarly, the law has a history of providing comparable
protections for adults with severe mental impairments, specifically in
the context of criminal law. Consider the Durham rule, for example,
which provides that “an accused [person] is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect.”188

185. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F) (2012).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) abrogated by United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). While this rule is no longer widely used in the
insanity context, its “product of” language would be useful in the Miranda context as applied to
children. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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These examples demonstrate that the law already uses workable
solutions that could satisfactorily account for the unique
characteristics of children. While this is not to say that childhood
should be considered akin to a disability, these other examples do
demonstrate that legal models capable of considering the special
nature of childhood already exist.
This Article proposes that the courts adapt the totality test by
assigning a stronger weight to a child’s age in the Miranda analysis.
In considering the totality of the circumstances, a child’s age is an
extremely significant circumstance. To hold otherwise yields the
results explored earlier in this Article. Thus, under the umbrella of the
totality test, the courts should craft a “product of childhood” inquiry
which directly asks, “Does a child’s waiver or confession arise out of,
or is it the product of, her childhood?” Such an addition would
necessarily require a court to consider the realities of science and
childhood psychology, and would provide children with the most
comprehensive protection of their Miranda rights to date.
V. CONCLUSION
As far as Miranda jurisprudence is concerned, it is time to finally
address the significant vulnerabilities that accompany childhood. By
paralleling the logic used to accommodate such vulnerabilities in other
legal contexts, such recognition has the potential to provide children
with the protections that both science and common sense recommend.
Indeed, science supports this idea, as the physical differences between
child and adult brains demonstrate the measurable developmental
differences that have critical effects on a child’s ability to understand
concepts like waiver of constitutional rights.
While each of the avenues mentioned above has its respective
strengths and weaknesses, the proposed “product of childhood”
inquiry provides considerable benefits while minimizing possibilities
for abuse and misapplication. It improves upon the already-existing
totality test by centering the inquiry on a child’s capacities rather than
the fictional reasonable person, while simultaneously moving the
analysis away from considerations that disproportionately benefit law
enforcement. Regardless of the solution, such problems will persist in
California unless and until a more comprehensive solution protecting
all children under the law is adopted.
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